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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE NEW MISSING LINK IN THE FIGHT
TO PREVENT CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND GENOCIDE?
Paul R. Williams* & Meghan E. Stewart†
INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the 1990s, the international community saw sig-
nificant development and utilization of legal frameworks for mechanisms 
designed to prevent crimes against humanity and genocide. These mechan-
isms were used in over a dozen conflicts and allowed the international 
community to intervene to halt atrocities, punish those responsible for atroc-
ities, provide redress for victims, and work together to prevent such crimes 
in the future. Utilized together, these mechanisms have the potential to be 
powerful tools against the perpetration of crimes against humanity and ge-
nocide.  
Humanitarian intervention is a particularly crucial piece in this 
emerging mosaic of measures designed to prevent crimes against humanity 
and genocide. Since the early 1990s, there has been a significant need for 
humanitarian intervention, a need that will likely continue well into the fu-
ture. For a time, there was also a significant reliance on humanitarian inter-
vention to address many of the worst intrastate and interstate conflicts.  
Unfortunately, despite the importance of humanitarian intervention, 
the international community is less likely to undertake meaningful and ef-
fective humanitarian interventions in the coming years. Future use of huma-
nitarian intervention is limited by both the failure to develop an adequate 
legal basis for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, and by a number of 
geo-political factors that mitigate against any significant humanitarian in-
terventions in the near future. As such, the international community has lost 
one of its key tools to prevent crimes against humanity and genocide, there-
by weakening its overall ability to address such atrocities.
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DEVELOPMENT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION SINCE 1990 
Humanitarian intervention can take many forms, including using 
military forces to help deliver humanitarian aid, protect humanitarian aid 
operations, protect and defend the victims of violence, and, in some in-
stances, defeat the perpetrators of violence.1
Furthermore, effective humanitarian intervention consists of some-
thing more than simply deploying peacekeepers. Too often peacekeeping 
missions are not provided ample personnel or material resources or are re-
stricted by a narrow mandate. The missions in Rwanda and Darfur are ex-
amples of the challenges such limitations create for interventions. Similarly, 
the deployment of peacekeepers after atrocities have occurred does not con-
stitute genuine humanitarian intervention. The purpose of humanitarian in-
tervention is to interpose international military forces into the conflict in 
order to either end the conflict or to provide for human security. To be ef-
fective, missions must be provided with the resources and mandate to meet 
that purpose. 
Since 1990, there have been a large number of interventions, as well 
as a significant and increasing need for humanitarian intervention. During 
that period, there have been at least seventeen humanitarian interventions, 
including: northern and southern Iraq, East Timor, Bosnia, Somalia, and 
Kosovo.2 Many of those interventions were effective in either halting or 
preventing further crimes against humanity and genocide, but many others 
were not.
In addition to those conflicts where the international community 
deployed forces in an effort to stop the conflict or lessen its consequences, 
there were many others that desperately required the intervention of the 
international community but did not receive it, including: the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Georgia, Moldova, Chechnya, and Uganda. 
In the cases where the international community conducted humani-
tarian interventions, whether effective or ineffective, international approval 
for the interventions was not always easily won. In fact, the international 
community is rarely united on such matters. Even where the international 
community had clear evidence of atrocities, such as in Bosnia and Kosovo, 
members of the international community have grappled with how to re-
spond, often stalling for months or years before conducting effective inter-
ventions.
1 Taylor B. Seybolt, HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION: THE CONDITIONS FOR 
SUCCESS AND FAILURE 39 (2007). 
2 Id. at 28. 
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THE NEED FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION WILL CONTINUE IN THE 
NEAR FUTURE.
Despite the large number of humanitarian interventions since 1990, 
the need for future humanitarian intervention has not waned, and will not 
wane in the foreseeable future. A number of current conflicts around the 
globe warrant international intervention based on their brutality and viola-
tions of international law.
In the Sudanese region of Darfur, for instance, government and 
government-backed forces have carried out a targeted, organized, and well-
documented campaign of genocide against Darfurian civilians. The cam-
paign has lasted for over four years, and conservative estimates number 
civilian deaths at over 200,000, with an additional two million refugees and 
internally displaced persons.3 Throughout the campaign the international 
community has watched from afar, chastising the Sudanese government, but 
failing to take decisive action to stop the attacks on civilians. Even the Unit-
ed States government, which took a stand early on by labeling the campaign 
genocide, has failed to match its rhetoric with action. The limited deploy-
ment of African Union peacekeepers, which are unable to even secure their 
own bases against attacks, and the slow deployment of a limited number of 
United Nations (U.N.) peacekeepers does not constitute the basis for a ge-
nuine humanitarian intervention. As currently configured, these limited 
forces have been unable to stop the ongoing genocide, and are unlikely to be 
able to do so in the future.  
Similarly, in recent months there have been widespread calls for in-
tervention in Sri Lanka,4 as the longstanding civil war there has resumed 
following a short-lived ceasefire. For over twenty years, the LTTE and the 
Government of Sri Lanka have fought a brutal civil war in which an esti-
mated 67,000 people have been killed and over half a million displaced. 
Despite calls for humanitarian intervention based on the Responsibility to 
Protect, it is unlikely that the international community will do more than 
simply provide good offices for ongoing negotiations. 
In Burma, military leaders have repeatedly used brutal force to defy 
calls for democratic reform while their harsh rule has pushed hundreds of 
thousands of refugees across the state’s border (the exact number is un-
known).5 In 1988, the military killed over 3,000 pro-democracy demonstra-
3 See Quick Guide: Darfur, BBC NEWS, Sept. 6, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 
5316306.stm.
4 See, e.g., Gareth Evans, President, Int’l Crisis Group, Eight Neelam Tiruchelvam Me-
morial Lecture at the Int’l Centre for Ethnic Studies (July 29, 2007), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4967.  
5 Chad Bouchard, Thailand Border Bracing for New Burmese Refugees, VOICE OF 
AMERICA, Oct. 3, 2007, http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-10-03-voa10.cfm.  
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tors. In the fall of 2007, the military launched a brutal crackdown against 
Buddhist monks and civilians seeking democratic reform. To quash the pro-
tests, the military raided monasteries, beating, torturing, and arresting the 
monks en masse.6 The military government has also carried out a long-term 
military campaign against numerous ethnic minorities in Burma. Recent 
studies utilizing satellite technology have scientifically confirmed ethnic 
cleansing of the Karen minority.7
Finally, many analysts predict, and a number recommend, that as 
the civil war in Iraq intensifies, the U.S. military may withdraw to four or 
five major bases and wait out the conflict. If this were to occur, there will be 
a need and call for humanitarian intervention to stop the civil war. It is un-
clear whether the United States would then redeploy its forces to stop the 
civil war. 
In each of these cases, the violence, level of brutality, and number 
of violations of international law is roughly equal to or greater than those in 
prior instances that have received humanitarian intervention; but the pros-
pect of intervention is limited. This is because the international community 
has, to date, failed to find an adequate legal framework to justify interven-
tion, and a range of geopolitical factors together limit the ability of the in-
ternational community to agree to conduct future interventions. 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION’S PLACE IN THE MOSAIC DEVELOPED TO 
PREVENT CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND GENOCIDE
Since 1990, the international community has come to rely more 
heavily on the combined strength of the various mechanisms designed to 
prevent crimes against humanity and genocide. In addition to humanitarian 
intervention, other mechanisms include: the creation of international crimi-
nal tribunals, the progressive development of international humanitarian 
law, the expanded jurisdiction of domestic courts to cover violations of in-
ternational humanitarian law, the development of the political will not to 
tolerate such crimes, and the evolution of U.N. institutions and mechanisms 
specifically designed to target the prevention of these crimes. In Bosnia and 
Kosovo, and many other conflicts around the globe, the international com-
munity combined these mechanisms to bring a lasting end to the conflict.  
Humanitarian intervention is a particularly important piece in this 
mosaic of mechanisms. Where most other mechanisms seek to prevent and 
punish, humanitarian intervention is the only means the international com-
munity has to utilize military forces during the commission of crimes 
6 Seth Mydans, More Deaths in Myanmar, and Defiance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, at 
A1. 
7 Donald G. McNeil, Myanmar’s Descent, Seen From 150 Miles Up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
29, 2007, at A6. 
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against humanity and genocide to deliver aid, protect civilians, or, in rare 
instances, defeat the perpetrators of these crimes. Thus, used effectively, 
humanitarian intervention can produce results. For example, analysis of the 
effectiveness of international threats in Kosovo shows that use of force, 
through humanitarian intervention, was the only way to force Serbia to halt 
its military campaign in Kosovo.8
Examples of effective uses of force in Bosnia and Kosovo include: 
NATO air strikes in 1995 to prevent further Serbian aggression against 
Bosnia; the deployment of an international force (IFOR) on the territory of 
Bosnia following the Dayton negotiations; the spring 1999 air campaign 
conducted against Serbian forces in Kosovo and Serbia proper in order to 
deter Serbian aggression in Kosovo; and the deployment of the Kosovo 
Force (KFOR) to provide security during the implementation of U.N. Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1244, providing for the interim international man-
agement of Kosovo.9
In contrast, examples of ineffective humanitarian intervention in 
Bosnia and Kosovo include the 1993–1995 limitation on NATO to strike 
only military assets that had fired on civilian targets, rather than any asset in 
the unit engaged in the attack, and United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) commanders’ failure to provide air support when it was re-
quested by UNPROFOR forces defending the safe areas around Srebrenica 
and Zepa, resulting in a civilian massacre.10
When humanitarian intervention is effectively coordinated with 
other mechanisms, the combined pressure of the mechanisms has the poten-
tial to operate as a powerful preventative force to stop and avert crimes 
against humanity and genocide. Used ineffectively, however, whether 
through lack of coordination, lack of understanding, competing political 
goals, or similar problems, such efforts can actually exacerbate a conflict, 
increasing the very problems these mechanisms are meant to address.11
A key example of the dangers of uncoordinated peacekeeping is the 
humanitarian intervention in Bosnia. During the first four years of the war 
in Bosnia, the international community failed to adequately support the 
peacekeepers mandated with protecting civilians. The peacekeepers were 
essentially prohibited from using force except in self-defense.12 Many 
commentators argue that the ineffective use of peacekeepers led to the mas-
sacre at Srebrenica in August 1995.13
8 PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE, 28 (2002).
9 Id. at 27. 
10 Id. at 27–28.  
11 Id. at 33–35. 
12 Id. at 153. 
13 Id.
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In a key turn of events, on August 30, 1995, NATO launched li-
mited air strikes against Serbian forces in Bosnia, shedding former limita-
tions on military intervention. The action immediately produced results—
Serbia agreed to key conditions, which they had formerly resisted. In fact, 
Slobodan Milosevic credited the air strikes with ending the war. In a con-
versation with General Wesley Clark shortly after the initialing of the Day-
ton Peace Accords in November 1995, Milosevic confided that “NATO won 
the war. . . . [I]t was your NATO, your bombs and missiles, your high tech-
nology that defeated us . . . we Serbs never had a chance against you.”14
Similarly, efforts at peacemaking failed in Kosovo until the interna-
tional community acted on its threat to use force. Although the United 
States and its NATO allies threatened use of force throughout the Ram-
bouillet/Paris negotiations, it was not until NATO planes began air strikes 
against key Serbian targets that the Serb offensive was halted.15 After seven-
ty days of air strikes, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, 
which established interim international governing structures and terms for 
peace in Kosovo.16
As the likelihood of any future humanitarian interventions is bleak, 
the international community may see its overall ability to prevent crimes 
against humanity and genocide decrease.  
THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE THE LEGAL BASIS FOR HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION
Despite the fact that the international community has engaged in 
over seventeen humanitarian interventions within the past twenty years, the 
legal basis for humanitarian intervention is not well settled. Numerous scho-
lars, including Sean Murphy, who tried to establish an overall framework 
for the legality of humanitarian intervention, and Michael Scharf, who 
sought to establish the legal basis for the case-specific instance of humanita-
rian intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo, have developed potential legal 
frameworks. Regardless, the international community has been so uncom-
fortable with the notion of humanitarian intervention that it has not been 
able to adopt either a coherent framework or a case-specific basis for inter-
ventions.17
14 Id. at 1572. 
15 Id. at 204–208. 
16 Id. at 208. 
17 See SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 
EVOLVING WORLD ORDER (1996); Paul Williams & Michael Scharf, NATO Intervention on 
Trial: The Legal Case that was Never Made, 1 HUM. RTS. REV. 103 (2000) [hereinafter 
NATO Intervention].  
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In Bosnia, the legal discussions regarding humanitarian intervention 
focused on interpreting the scope of intervention authorized by the U.N. 
Security Council. In Kosovo, the discussions shifted away from legal argu-
ments and focused on the moral authority to intervene. In the aftermath of 
the two genocidal campaigns in the Balkans, the international community 
reflected on the international legal framework for humanitarian intervention 
and developed the concept of the Responsibility to Protect. Nevertheless, 
these legal arguments have not provided states with a comfortable frame-
work within which to act.  
Bosnia
During the genocide in Bosnia, despite the clear and repeated autho-
rization by U.N. Security Council Resolutions to use force to stop the geno-
cide and crimes against humanity, the humanitarian intervention faltered. 
U.N. member states and the U.N. Secretary-General actively sought to in-
terpret the mandate as narrowly as possible, and in some cases sought to 
erode the moral imperative to undertake humanitarian intervention.18
For instance, in a supplement to his 1995 Annual Report, An Agen-
da for Peace, then U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali lauded 
the “new kind of United Nations operation” developed in Bosnia and Soma-
lia, in which, “even though the use of force is authorized under Chapter VII 
of the Charter, the United Nations remains neutral and impartial between 
the warring parties, without a mandate to stop the aggressor (if one can be 
identified) or impose a cessation of hostilities.” The report explains that the 
Security Council resolutions provide the “United Nations a humanitarian 
mandate under which the use of force is authorized, but for limited and local 
purposes and not to bring the war to an end.”19
Similarly, the United States and Europe, bogged down by a funda-
mental misunderstanding of the conflict, openly debated the strategic impor-
tance of Bosnia. Within the United States, officials sought to downplay the 
violence in Bosnia, disregarding classified intelligence detailing rape camps 
and massacres, to avoid the moral imperative to undertake a humanitarian 
intervention. The Bush Administration followed a policy that the United 
States had no strategic interest in Bosnia, and that European states should 
take the lead with regard to the conflict.20 Within France, Great Britain, and 
18 Paul Williams & Michael Scharf, The Letter of the Law, in WITH NO PEACE TO KEEP:
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING AND THE WAR IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 34, 35–39 (Ben 
Cohen & George Stamkoski eds., 1995); WILLIAMS & SCHARF, supra note 10, at 82–83. 
19 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organiza-
tion: Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary General on the 
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, para. 19, delivered to the General 
Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/1995/1, A/50/60 (Jan.3, 1995). 
20 WILLIAMS & SCHARF, supra note 10, at 64. 
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other European states, leaders focused on alternative means to end the con-
flict, such as partition and appeasement, rather than the use of force.21 Brit-
ain, in particular, was committed to achieving a negotiated settlement that 
would not involve the use of force by the international community, and 
therefore was willing to agree to partition as a means of appeasing Serbia.22
Similarly, the French, who saw the Serbs as their traditional allies, tried to 
limit the role of international peacekeepers to one of minimizing human 
suffering while seeking a negotiated settlement.23 As a result, when the in-
ternational community finally decided to intervene after the massacre in 
Srebrenica, there was no clearly articulated legal basis for doing so. 
After the end of the Bosnian conflict, Professor Sean Murphy at-
tempted to make the case for a customary international law of humanitarian 
intervention. Surveying state practices since the early 1800s, with a particu-
lar focus on interventions in the post Cold War era, Murphy argued for the 
establishment of customary international law that allows for humanitarian 
intervention in cases of widespread deprivations of human rights.24 Al-
though influential, this legal framework has not been widely adopted by 
states. 
Kosovo  
As the Serbian regime turned from Bosnia to Kosovo and began to 
commit crimes against humanity, a handful of legal scholars put forth a se-
ries of legal arguments to justify humanitarian intervention. These argu-
ments relied upon U.N. Security Council Resolutions relating to the former 
Yugoslavia and emerging customary international law.25 Despite this legal 
basis, the international community refused to articulate a legal argument for 
the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. Reportedly, the Office of the Le-
gal Advisor at the State Department refused to even provide a legal justifi-
cation to the Secretary’s Office. France and Germany hesitated at the use of 
force without Security Council authorization, and Russia assured Milosevic 
that no such authority would be granted.26 In the end, the European Union, 
and other states, opted for the rather quixotic argument of “illegal but legi-
timate.”27
21 Id. at 63–87.  
22 Id. at 72. 
23 Id. at 74–77. 
24 Murphy, supra note 19, at 34.  
25 NATO Intervention, supra note 19, at 104–05. 
26 WILLIAMS & SCHARF, supra note 10, at 184. 
27 INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 4 (2000), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/ 
documents/thekosovoreport.htm.  
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In addition to failing to establish a legal basis for intervention in 
Kosovo, the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo also served to further con-
fuse the international debate regarding a legal framework for humanitarian 
intervention. Not only had NATO carried out air strikes without specific 
authority from the Security Council, but it did not even argue that it had 
such authority. In the wake of the intervention, legal scholars articulated a 
range of new possible legal frameworks for intervention.  
In 2002, Jane Stromseth analyzed the four frameworks that emerged 
post-Kosovo. The first framework argued that intervention was only legal 
when authorized by the Security Council.28 The second argued for “excusa-
ble breach,” in which “deviation from the strict letter of the U.N. Charter 
will be tolerated in exceptional circumstances.”29 This does not argue a spe-
cific framework, but rather an exception that may be judged on a case-by-
case basis. The third framework argued for the evolution of customary in-
ternational law to allow for humanitarian intervention in specific circums-
tances.30 This approach maintains the central role of the U.N. Security 
Council in determining acceptable uses of force while also recognizing the 
necessity of force in particular situations. The fourth framework argued for 
a right of intervention similar to a right to self-defense under international 
law.31 In the end, the third framework became the most prominent in the 
form of the Responsibility to Protect.  
The Responsibility to Protect 
In the face of the tension between the emerging norm of human se-
curity and sovereignty, the debate on a legal basis for intervention has now 
shifted from humanitarian intervention to the Responsibility to Protect. This 
shift transformed the debate from the question of the right to intervene to 
one about the responsibility of states to protect innocent lives and the duties 
inherent in sovereignty.  
In 2001, the Canadian sponsored International Commission on In-
tervention and State Sovereignty published a report entitled The Responsi-
bility to Protect, which emphasized a duty inherent in state sovereignty to 
safeguard the lives of civilians. The Commission argued that if this duty 
was not upheld, other governments, with the authorization of the United 
Nations, had the right to act, even to the extent of using military force as a 
28 Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental 
Change, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 232, 
241–42 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O’Keohane eds., 2003). 
29 Id. at 243. 
30 Id. at 244. 
31 Id. at 245.  
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last resort.32 This report drew upon concepts articulated by others such as 
Frances Deng, a Commission member.33
The Commission’s report was soon followed in the report of the 
U.N. Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, which endorsed  
the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to 
protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military interven-
tion as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, 
ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law 
which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to pre-
vent.34
The concept was further endorsed by the United Nations by its in-
corporation in Koffi Annan’s Report to the U.N. General Assembly In
Larger Freedom, and in the September 2005 World Summit by the U.N. 
General Assembly, thus gaining broad international acceptance.35
Despite broad acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect, the inter-
national community has failed to find a legal basis in which to seat the con-
cept. The Responsibility to Protect argument essentially adopted the moral 
approach of just war theory, but not the legal framework. Interestingly, as 
the historical advocates of the just war approach placed “right authority” 
with the Pope, those who advocate for a “responsibility to protect” place 
that authority with the United Nations. 
32 INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND ST. SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT 13 (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp. 
33 See, e.g., FRANCES DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA (1996).  
34 Chair of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges & Change, Transmittal Letter 
2004 from the Chair of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, para. 203, 
addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 1, 2004). 
35 The Secretary General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Hu-
man Rights for All, para. 4, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 
21, 2005). “In our efforts to strengthen the contributions of States, civil society, the private 
sector and international institutions to advancing a vision of larger freedom, we must ensure 
that all involved assume their responsibilities to turn good words into good deeds. We there-
fore need new mechanisms to ensure accountability—the accountability of States to their 
citizens, of States to each other, of international institutions to their members and of the 
present generation to future generations. Where there is accountability we will progress; 
where there is none we will underperform. The business of the summit to be held in Septem-
ber 2005 must be to ensure that, from now on, promises made are promises kept.” Id. at para. 
22.
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NUMEROUS GEO-POLITICAL FACTORS MITIGATE AGAINST ANY 
SIGNIFICANT HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN THE FORESEEABLE 
FUTURE
In addition to the international community’s failure to adopt a legal 
framework for intervention, a range of other factors mitigate against the 
chance there will be any significant humanitarian intervention in the fore-
seeable future. These factors, such as the increasing tension between mili-
tary forces and humanitarian agencies in conflict zones,36 the fact that an 
effective humanitarian intervention requires military resources that few 
states possess,37 and the reality that states undertaking genuine humanitarian 
intervention can only do so if they have the political will to protect strangers 
36 There is an inherent tension between the means and objectives of humanitarian agencies 
and the means and objectives of the military, which makes many “humanitarians” uneasy 
with supporting military intervention to provide for human security. Catriona Gourlay, Part-
ners Apart: Managing Civil-Military Co-operation in Humanitarian Interventions, 3 
DISARMAMENT FORUM 35, http.//www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art131.pdf. Humanitarian 
aid agencies and their staff continue to define their role as non-political and impartial, seek-
ing to minimize violence and treat all sides equally. Id. Military forces, in contrast, take sides 
and seek to kill the enemy. Id. This tension is readily evident in the operation of the mix 
civilian/military Provisional Reconstruction Teams in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and has 
hampered their ability to accomplish their objectives. Greg Grant, Tension Builds in Iraq,
GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE, Dec. 1, 2006, http://www.govexec.com/features/1206-01/1206-
01na1.htm.
37 The interventions in both Bosnia and Kosovo consisted primarily of U.S. forces—by 
one count over 90% of the sorties made over Kosovo were by American warplanes. STEVE 
BOWMAN, KOSOVO AND MACEDONIA: U.S. AND ALLIED MILITARY OPERATIONS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 4 (2003). With American and British forces pre-
occupied in Iraq and Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, the military resources for an 
effective humanitarian intervention are simply not available. It may still be possible for 
small-scale humanitarian interventions, such as the case of East Timor where the Australians 
formed the bulk of the forces. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Timor-
Leste, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tt.html (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2008). 
  Coupled with the lack of capacity is the fact that many conflicts that require humanita-
rian intervention are simply too remote from states that possess the military capacity to inter-
vene. Richard Caplan, Humanitarian Intervention: Which Way Forward? 14 ETHICS & INT’L
AFFAIRS 24 (2000). The case of the Sudanese genocide in Darfur is often cited as a conflict-
too-far. Despite the fact the United States has declared the conflict in Darfur to be genocide 
and the international community has condemned the conflict, no state or alliance seems to 
posses the resources to effectively operate in that remote region. See US Convinced of Darfur 
‘genocide,’ BBC NEWS, Feb. 1, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4227835.stm. As 
noted above, the A.U. troops the have been deployed seem barely able to defend their own 
bases, let alone protect the civilian population or defeat the forces committing genocide. 
Darfur Rebels Attacks Base, Kill 10 Peacekeepers, CNN.COM, Sept. 30, 2007, 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/africa/09/30/darfur.peacekeepers/index.html.  
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at the cost of their soldiers’ lives.38 Such factors limit the capacity of actors 
to carry out interventions and introduce questions regarding the necessity or 
effectiveness of interventions. 
Many humanitarian interventions have been ineffective in saving lives 
First, and probably most importantly, it is not clear that humanita-
rian intervention has been particularly effective in protecting human securi-
ty. Recently, Taylor Seybolt analyzed seventeen humanitarian interventions 
and found that just over half of those interventions were actually effective in 
saving lives. Dr. Seybolt defines effectiveness as saving more lives than 
would have been the case if there were not a humanitarian intervention. Dr. 
Seybolt further finds that humanitarian interventions led by the United Na-
tions have generally failed or have achieved only mixed results, while those 
led by coalitions or undertaken unilaterally have had much greater success 
rates. This leads Dr. Seybolt to the conclusion that the United Nations 
should not lead humanitarian interventions.39 The significance of this argu-
ment cannot be underestimated, as the United Nations is considered by the 
advocates of the Responsibility to Protect as the primary decision-maker 
with regard to when the international community can intervene.
The return of big-power politics 
The humanitarian interventions of the 1990s were possible in large 
part because China was preoccupied with its internal economic transforma-
tion and the USSR had dissolved, leaving Russia in a state of economic and 
political disarray. China and Russia’s re-emergence as global powers are 
likely to chill humanitarian interventions because both have demonstrated a 
willingness to wield their Security Council veto to prevent humanitarian 
interventions. During the recent crisis in Burma, for instance, China and, to 
a lesser extent, Russia have blocked calls for U.N. Security Council action, 
arguing that the Security Council is not the appropriate venue to consider 
the crisis.40 Similarly, during the height of the genocide in Darfur, China 
38 The most striking example of how humanitarian intervention fails when states are un-
willing to pay this price is the Srebrenica massacre, where the Dutch peacekeeping forces 
stepped aside and allowed Serb forces to massacre over 7,000 civilians. Dutch Government 
Quits Over Srebrenica, BBC NEWS, Apr. 16, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
1933144.stm. Restrictions by many European governments on their forces operating in Afg-
hanistan, in particular German forces, indicates that many of these states remain unwilling to 
commit to the real cost of humanitarian intervention even when they do deploy troops. 
SEBASTIAN MERZ, STILL ON THE WAY TO AFGHANISTAN? GERMANY AND ITS FORCES IN THE 
HINDU KUSH, SIPRI PROJECT PAPER 8 (Nov. 2007). 
39 SEYBOLT, supra note 3, at 270–73.  
40 Malaysia Pushes for Burma Talks, BBC NEWS, Oct. 7, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
asia-pacific/7032291.stm.  
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blocked Security Council action, protecting its close relationship with the 
Sudanese government and its oil interests in the country.41 Europe’s depen-
dence on Russian oil and gas, and Russia’s willingness to use those re-
sources as a political lever will further limit the ability of European states to 
call for, or participate in, humanitarian intervention. 
Preemption on national security concerns.  
Although preemption is not the same as humanitarian interven-
tion—nor does it seek the same outcome—its resuscitation by the United 
States and other states will likely further inhibit reliance on the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention in coming years. The re-emergence of preemption 
as a basis for intervention provides states with a more familiar doctrine on 
which to justify military intervention. Notably, the first humanitarian inter-
ventions, such as Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda to remove Idi Amin, 
relied on preemption based on national security when they could have relied 
on humanitarian intervention. Similarly, the recent Ethiopian incursion into 
Somalia was also justified on national security grounds.42
Legal institutions that were created to press for justice have been used in a 
way to chill humanitarian intervention.
The legal institutions developed to prevent crimes against humanity 
and genocide have been utilized in ways that chill the possibility of future 
humanitarian interventions. For example, from mid-1999 until June 2000, 
the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia undertook an extensive review to determine whether to initiate a 
formal war crimes investigation of NATO for acts committed during the 
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. The review was initiated in response 
to complaints from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Russia, and some 
Canadian law professors. By most accounts, the review was carried out in 
large part to demonstrate that the Yugoslav Tribunal was impartial. Over 
one year later, the Prosecutor concluded that no investigation was war-
ranted.43 With the creation of the International Criminal Court, few states 
are likely to be willing to undertake a humanitarian intervention, knowing 
41 See Roberta Cohen, Calling on China: The China-Darfur Connection, BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION, Aug. 5, 2004, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/cohenr/20040805.htm.  
42 Alex Perry, Interview: Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, TIME, Sept. 6, 2007, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1659420-2,00.html (arguing the Islamic 
Courts Union had declared war on Ethiopia).  
43 Press Release, Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo. (ICTY), Final Report to the 
Prosecutor by the Comm. Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the 
Fed. Republic of Yugo., para. 90, PR/P.I.S./510-E (June 13, 2000). 
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that the prosecutor may then launch an investigation simply to demonstrate 
impartiality. 
The tendency of tribunals, in particular the Yugoslav Tribunal, to 
indict individuals from all sides of a conflict out of a need to seem political-
ly balanced has heightened this fear. These indictments tend to confuse the 
facts of and rationales for conflicts, however, blurring the line between 
criminal and non-criminal acts, and thus eroding the basis for humanitarian 
intervention.
The recent International Court of Justice case concerning the geno-
cide committed against Bosnia will likely prove to further chill future hu-
manitarian interventions.44 The decision’s confusing interpretation of the 
legal standard for genocide, particularly with regard to establishing an un-
justifiably high legal standard needed to prove genocide, will likely influ-
ence whether states will intervene to prevent other genocides, including the 
current genocide in Darfur.
Question of moral authority  
In the current political climate, humanitarian intervention requires a 
level of moral authority that few, if any, states or organizations possess. 
With the U.S.-led military engagement in Iraq, combined with the tendency 
of the E.U. member states to support an approach of appeasement over in-
tervention and the continued controversies surrounding the conduct of U.N. 
peacekeepers—ranging from drug trafficking to permitting the Srebrenica 
massacre, and standing on the sidelines during the Rwanda genocide—the 
few states or organizations that formerly possessed the moral authority to 
undertake a large scale humanitarian intervention have eroded that authori-
ty, and no new states or organizations have stepped in to fill the void. 
CONCLUSION
Humanitarian intervention will soon be the missing piece in the mo-
saic of mechanisms developed to prevent crimes against humanity and ge-
nocide. By failing to establish a clear legal basis for humanitarian interven-
tion, and by failing to shift the manner in which it perceives human security, 
the international community has let a valuable tool slip from its repertoire 
that could have been used to prevent atrocities. 
44 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Judgment (Feb. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf#view=FitH&pagemode=none&search= 
%22Bosnia%22.
